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II.4. From Kristallnacht to War, November 1938-August 1939 
 
While the economic and administrative pressure on ‘Jews’ in Germany was already intense 
by the autumn of 1938, it was about to be made indescribably worse by the events of the 
ReichsKristallnacht.1 An orgy of violence and destruction swept over Germany. Officially 91 
people were killed on the night of broken glass, but many hundreds more died of their 
wounds or in concentration camps in the following days and weeks. Approximately 30,000 
male ‘Jews’ were arrested and taken to concentration camps. Whatever funds or assets most 
‘Jews’ had still possessed in November 1938 had been looted or destroyed in the pogrom, 
and the 1 billion mark fine levied on the community to pay for the damage and various other 
impositions effectively bankrupted most of its collective activities. All ‘Jewish’ business 
activity was to cease by 1 January 1939 and all remaining ‘Jewish’ assets and works of art 
were to be sold for the benefit of the Reich.2  
Emigration from the Reich from 1933 had tended to claim the best candidates, and 
the ‘Jews’ who remained after November 1938 were less attractive for potential countries of 
refuge, but they were still placed under enormous pressure to leave. At the same time the 
German authorities sought to segregate them from all aspects of German life. Restrictions of 
all kinds rained down on the ‘Jews’, their pauperisation proceeded apace and ‘apartheid’ 
became a fact of daily life. They also became subject to segregated labour deployment as 
the Nazis chose to exploit those whose unemployment made them dependent on state 
welfare.3  In March 1939 the German state annexed Bohemia-Moravia, a further 118,000 
‘Jews’ came under Nazi control and it was not long before Adolf Eichmann established a 
branch of the Zentralstelle in Prague. Similarly in Germany, a Reichszentrale für jüdische 
Auswanderung was established in Berlin to centralize ‘all work for ‘Jewish’ emigration’. 
In this context, it should be remembered that the flow of people escaping from 
Greater Germany were by no means the only refugees in Europe at the end of the 1930s. 
There were well-founded fears in Western Europe that much larger numbers of Jewish 
refugees might be created by the states of Eastern Europe. Any generosity to refugees from 
Germany might well stimulate the impatience and rapacity of the Polish and Hungarian 
government to solve ‘their’ Jewish question in the same way as Nazi Germany had 
attempted to do. In January the Romanian government followed the Polish and Hungarian 
example and enacted legislation that stripped Jews naturalised after 1918 of their citizenship 
(and barred Jews from a broad range of professions). As the Romanian judiciary declared 
these laws unconstitutional they were never implemented, but the intent was clear and this 
potential efflux from Eastern Europe was a constant threat.4 At the same time, there was also 
the reality of up to 400,000 Republican refugees from Spain as the civil war came to an end.  
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Forced emigration remained the goal of the Nazi leadership and it continued to use all 
the means at its disposal to remove impoverished ‘Jews’ from Reich territory, both legal and 
illegal.5 ‘Jewish’ concentration camps inmates were only to be released if, and only if, they 
emigrated.6 Emigration overseas was one option, but it remained costly. International Jewish 
charities provided some of the finance through Jewish organisations inside Germany. The 
Nazis also forced wealthy ‘Jews’ in Germany wanting to leave to co-finance the emigration of 
their less affluent co-religionists.7 Emigration overseas nonetheless remained difficult. 
Immigration into Latin America became increasingly restricted as the authorities gave in to 
local protectionist and antisemitic forces.8 There were only a few exceptions to the worldwide 
restrictive immigration policies. After Kristallnacht, Great Britain was the first state to 
introduce a more generous policy of temporary protection and even the United States 
opened its doors slightly wider to the victims of Nazi policy. As Bat-Ami Zucker explains in 
her chapter, President Roosevelt felt he had a moral obligation to aid the refugees, but for 
electoral reasons and the public mood of restrictionism he was unwilling to tamper with the 
fundamental principles of his country’s immigration laws.  
For those with nowhere else to go, the International Settlements at Shanghai 
provided a possible destination simply because it was a territory outside the international 
system of nation-states which, although under Japanese control, was self-governing and did 
not demand visas for entry. In spite of the lack of any real settlement opportunities there and 
the potential for abject poverty, many refugees chose, or were forced to take this as their 
only option. Some 1,500 had arrived by the end of 1938 and by September 1939, their 
numbers had grown to around 8,000.9  
The pace of emigration was much too slow for the Nazis. The German authorities 
were fully aware that the J-stamp on the German passports had served to hinder their 
emigration programme. Hermann Göring’s famous speech of 6 December 1938 to the 
Gauleiter in which he outlined the anti-Jewish policy following the ReichsKristallnacht 
indicated how this difficulty might be overcome. ‘Jews’ who were able to finance their 
emigration, but whose J-stamped documents prevented them being considered as 
acceptable immigrants could exceptionally be issued with regular German passports.10  
The Nazis were also aware of how few places in the world would accept penniless 
‘Jews’ as immigrants. Palestine was the favourite place to dump ‘Jews’ and the SS 
collaborated with revisionist Zionists from June 1938 and with the Jewish Agency from 
January 1939 onwards to organise illegal immigration into the mandate, largely by sea. 
When the Royal Navy began intercepting these ships in early 1939 and preventing the 
immigrants from landing, the refugees were dropped off in small boats just outside territorial 
waters and rowed the last few miles to the Palestinian coast.11 Latin American ports also 
became targets for Nazi agencies anxious to export as many Jews as possible using 
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schemes that involved transporting refugees en masse.12 In January 1939 they allowed the 
steamship ‘Königstein’ to leave for Barbados although fully aware that the passengers did 
not possess enough landing money.13 The ship was not permitted to land and wandered the 
Caribbean for several days, while the JDC looked for a destination. Finally the passengers 
were allowed to land in Venezuela. During 1939, the Gestapo organised numerous other 
steamship voyages containing Jews with dubious or non-existent travel documents to land 
refugees wherever the authorities might permit.14 The St Louis was the most famous of these 
voyages, but it was by no means the only example.15  
German Jewish organizations consistently warned the Nazi regime that this dumping 
strategy could be counterproductive, and from the beginning of January 1939, several 
outside organisations attempted to curb this brutal policy.16  The main British and American 
aid organisations – the Council for German Jewry and the JDC - threatened to remove their 
subsidies from all ‘Jewish’ emigration from Greater Germany if such damaging experiments 
continued.17 Dumping refugees also created substantial risks for the steamship companies. If 
on arrival the refugees’ travel documents were deemed insufficient or invalid and they were 
refused permission to land, the shipping companies were obliged to return them to their point 
of departure. As a result, many reputable Western European carriers became reluctant to 
transport Jewish refugees overseas and most of the journeys were made in chartered Italian 
or Greek ships.18 The charter companies insured their risk by demanding that the refugees 
buy return tickets and also that they paid part of the fare in (hard) foreign currency.19 The 
British government became determined to halt uncontrolled illegal immigration to Palestine 
and applied diplomatic pressure on the European states from which illegal vessels had 
departed. The states under whose flags of convenience the illegal ships operated also found 
themselves targeted by the British and by May 1939 British surveillance and diplomatic 
intervention had made it impossible to use Mediterranean ports as a means of reaching 
Palestine illegally.20 The German authorities quickly took the necessary steps to assure that 
emigration overseas could continue, primarily by employing German shipping companies to 
carry out the task.21 To expedite further illegal journeys to Palestine, the German authorities 
supported Zionist organized voyages that began in Vienna or Bratislava and used the 
Danube as a route to the Black Sea.22  
According to the Jewish organizations, about 50.000 people left Greater Germany 
between January the first 1939 and the outbreak of the Second World War in September. 
Palestine and Asia (overwhelmingly Shanghai) each took at least 10% of these emigrants, 
but most who left for an overseas destination - nearly a third of the total - headed for the 
Americas. For the first time since 1933, the United States took nearly as many as the South 
American states. However for the first time since 1933, the majority of refugees from Greater 
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Germany in 1939 remained in Europe. By 1939 legal emigration and resettlement overseas 
had been closed to the vast majority of ‘Jews’ still in the Greater German Reich.  
For many, the countries bordering Germany represented the only possibility of 
escape.23 While the German authorities turned a blind eye to illegal crossings into Eastern 
Europe, they carefully policed the frontiers with Western Europe after November 1938. Thus 
Jewish refugees wanting to flee to most countries of Western Europe had not only to outwit 
the border police of the country they were trying to enter, but also those of Germany. From 
early November 1938, the German authorities had issued orders to arrest all Jews found 
near the border without the necessary passport and a visa to enter either Belgium, France or 
Switzerland and transfer the adult male Jews among them to concentration camps. By 
January 1939 this highly repressive policy was widened to include the whole western border 
of Germany. The German border police stations at the German-Dutch border 
(Grenzpolizeikommissariate) were instructed to stop all German (and Austrian) Jews from 
entering Dutch territory. The slow communication of these instructions from Berlin indicates 
that the Dutch insistence upon cooperation to control the border had not been considered a 
priority.  However, no such policy was even attempted at the Danish frontier, presumably 
because the Danish authorities saw no great problems at their frontier and had not pressed 
the German authorities to take any action.24 
Although the pressures on ‘Jews’ to leave the Reich remained extremely brutal, it is 
clear that in general the German authorities no longer wanted to force ‘Jews’ into 
neighbouring western countries. However local examples of ‘dumping’ continued to take 
place. Thus for example, the Gestapo sent a group of ‘Jewish’ children on a train across the 
Dutch border to Nijmegen and then just abandoned them, thus more or less daring the Dutch 
authorities to send them back. A SOPADE report noted in January 1939 that the ‘Jews’ of a 
town near the French frontier were herded into the square and then forced across the nearby 
border, only to return when the French authorities refused to admit them.25  
Dumping of ‘Jews’ was, however, largely shifted away from the countries west of 
Germany and there was a good deal of cross-border co-operation. This cooperation was 
largely the result of continuing diplomatic pressure on the German authorities and the wish to 
maintain normal travel arrangements between states. The instructions to the German border 
police were easier to implement at the Belgian, Swiss and French border as the authorities 
only had to arrest and transfer all male ‘Jews’ without the necessary passport and visa to a 
concentration camp. However, throughout 1939, German policies at the Dutch frontier 
remained more lenient. This was primarily because entry to the Netherlands did not formally 
depend on having a visa – and therefore only ‘Jews’ whose entry to the Netherlands could 
only be made illegally were to be incarcerated.26 The local German border police was 
hesitant about sending ‘Jews’ with valid passports to a concentration camp and in March 
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1939 the Gestapostelle Düsseldorf decided that ‘Jews’ caught near the Dutch border who 
had a valid passport were not to be imprisoned, as there was no evidence that they intended 
to cross the border illegally. They were merely to be sent back to their place of origin, usually 
Vienna, and the authorities there were instructed only to (re-) issue passports if the individual 
had been given permission to enter another country.27  
 
Changes in Western European refugee aid   
 
The violence of the Kristallnacht sent shock waves across Europe and provoked a sense of 
outrage in both the press and in public opinion. The urgency of providing aid became clear to 
many and the recognition that the pogrom had created new categories of victims meant that 
it became a matter that attracted interest beyond the left-wing organisations and the Jewish 
community. This broadening of interest can be seen in the creation of refugee aid 
committees for Christian ‘Jews’ and the non-sectarian appeals for refugee aid that followed 
the events of November 1938.  
A number of new refugee committees were established across Europe to help Jewish 
converts to Christianity. There had been refugee aid groups that had given assistance to the 
small number of politically active Christian refugees since 1935, but it was only after 
Kristallnacht that the major Christian churches began to realize that they had converts 
among those persecuted as Jews in Germany who fell foul of racial laws because of their 
Jewish descent. Christian aid organisations started to cater for these ‘non-aryan’ Christians, 
as pressure on Jewish relief organisations increased.  Until 1938 Jewish refugee 
organisations had helped all those categorized as Jews by the Nazis, without regard for their 
religion. Thus professing and non-professing ‘Jews’ were supported, as well as Christian 
converts. This inclusivity came to an end in 1939 when Jewish charitable resources were 
stretched beyond all limits and the organisations became increasingly selective. ‘Jews’ who 
could be helped by either Christian or left-wing organizations were directed elsewhere.28 
Nevertheless, the plight of these ‘non-aryan’ Christians undoubtedly broadened the general 
public support for the refugees from Nazi Germany. 
This wider support was particularly evident in Britain and the Netherlands. In Britain, 
Stanley Baldwin, the former Conservative Prime Minister, launched a national appeal. He 
called upon the British as Christians to support the non-aryan refugees, be they Christians or 
Jews. His broadcast appeal was extremely successful and raised over £250,000 by the end 
of December. There was also a national appeal in the Netherlands, launched by a broadcast 
by Prime Minister Hendricus Colijn, and supported by many mayors that raised 473.000 
guilders.29 In other countries the general public was much less supportive and leading 
personalities were much less inclined to put their weight behind such a campaign. For 
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example in Belgium, the Prime Minister and the Belgian Red Cross refused to lead the 
campaign. In the same vein, the Belgian Roman Catholic church refused to canvass support 
from their parishioners for financial support for refugees, even if they were Christians.30 Any 
widening social support for the refugees did not imply that the authorities were prepared to 
help finance refugee aid. Refugee aid remained a private, not a public affair. Only the Swiss 
and Danish authorities had given some token support to refugee aid and their subsidies were 
divided equally among the existing respectable refugee committees, but when the 
expenditure of the Jewish refugee aid committees exploded, the public subsidy was even 
more of a drop in the ocean.31   
 
Refugee and immigration policy in Continental Europe  
 
Initial reactions to the Kristallnacht in most liberal states were in tune with public opinion as 
restrictive policies were attenuated or promises were made that this would happen. In 
practice, however, governments remained cautious, realising that the apparently random 
fatalities gave any ‘Jew’ coming from Germany a prima facie claim to refugee status as being 
in mortal danger. Acknowledgement of this new facet of the persecution in Germany 
undermined the legitimacy of existing restrictive policies. However an open border policy 
could cause a mass immigration of destitute refugees, thus a selective immigration policy 
had to be pursued which safeguarded the possibility of expelling unwanted or uninvited 
‘Jews’ from Germany.  
 
Subcontracting and strengthening external control 
  
All state authorities continued to believe that the flight of refugees from Nazi Germany had to 
be contained. The easiest way to do this was at the border and in their consulates abroad, 
without any public accountability for the decisions taken. Given the increased sympathy for 
those fleeing Nazi Germany from some sections of the public, the external controls became 
ever more important. The J-stamp on German passports became the pivot of the external 
control of the liberal states of Continental Europe as it provided an instant distinction 
between ‘genuine’ visitors from Germany and those whose true purpose was to stay.  
In order to ensure that refugees did not reach their territory, Western European states 
relied on several new forms of remote control beyond just a visa requirement. As mentioned 
before, states carrying out persecution were given inducements to stop unauthorized 
emigration, and this became a key part of the remote control policy as immigration control 
became largely dependent on German cooperation.32 Other countries were also called upon 
to combat uninvited immigration from Nazi Germany. Every country considered itself a victim 
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of ‘lax’ neighbours whose borders were too porous. In spite of ever more restrictive 
immigration policies, large numbers of refugees were still arriving and some states were 
castigated because they let refugees enter who just passed through their territory en route 
elsewhere.33 The liberal European states thus continued to pressure each other to impose 
ever-tighter immigration restrictions; a trend that built up a momentum of it own that went 
beyond domestic considerations. Non-governmental agencies were also enlisted to stop the 
inflow of refugees. In some countries, transport companies were forced by the threat of 
sanctions to scrutinise their passengers’ passports and visas for their validity, and refugee 
aid committees were pressured into advising would-be refugees not to leave Germany 
independently. 34 
Visa-issuing policies became increasingly restrictive. Consulates were in the front line 
and had to sift the wanted from the unwanted. Consular personnel were instructed to be 
particularly vigilant when dealing with both German and Eastern European Jewish 
applicants. Such people found it increasingly difficult to obtain a visa for a Western European 
country, even for a short stay, let alone for permanent settlement.35  The fact that 
Luxemburg, the Netherlands and Denmark did not require visas for Germans had no 
meaning for German ‘Jews’ as from 1938 onwards while ‘aryan’ Germans could still travel to 
these countries without a visa, they had to meet a semi-official obligation to have such a 
document in their passports.  
Immediately after the Munich crisis in September 1938, although there were no 
official policy changes, a number of states became pro-active in selecting ‘deserving’ 
refugees from those who had to leave the Sudetenland and promising visas. France initially 
undertook to provide 310, then 700, but in the end only about 100 visas were actually issued. 
Belgium granted 253 visas and Denmark 163.36 The selection criteria used in these cases 
made the states’ primary definition of who was a refugee deserving protection transparent.37 
In line with the hierarchy of persecution prevalent at that time, only political activists were 
granted visa. Being persecuted as ‘Jew’ did not, in itself, qualify anybody for protection within 
this scheme. Communist refugees were also excluded from the Belgian and Danish gestures 
towards the victims of Munich. However Belgium did agree to allow known German 
communists who had resided legally in Belgium before their departure to enlist in the 
International Brigades in Spain to return. Likewise Great Britain granted visa to communist 
political refugees, including former combatants of the International Brigades but Denmark 
and Switzerland refused to do this.38 Although there was little discussion, this positive 
discrimination towards political refugees was not perceived as unjust by the authorities. The 
fact that there were ostensibly so many organisations dedicated to the ‘Jewish’ refugees 
gave credence to the non-Jewish refugee organisations’ claims that ‘it was time to do 
something for the non-Jewish refugee’.39   
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The victims of racial persecution were not entirely neglected and some were actively 
afforded protection, but it was always kept in mind that they should not pose any problems 
for the receiving country, either qualitatively or quantitatively. As mentioned before, refugees 
with close personal ties to a country or those with economic assets were still eligible for a 
visa. Refugees who had definite emigration plans and all the necessary papers were 
sometimes given temporary residence. Such people had to guarantee that they would 
emigrate overseas within a few days or at most a few months.40 Immediately after the 
Kristallnacht only Swiss policy remained strictly on the course set before November 1938, 
other countries showed greater generosity and in particular more transit-refugees were 
allowed to wait in safety for the final issue of an immigration visa and the departure of their 
ship or flight. The Dutch even put forward a plan whereby Western Europe would act as a 
holding point for ‘Jews’ re-emigrating overseas, with all the costs borne by Jewish charities. 
The Dutch government was prepared to allow the legal admission of up to 2,000 ‘Jewish’ 
refugees, a figure increased to 7,000 by public pressure. Selection remained in government 
hands with the Jewish refugee aid committee being allowed to recommend only 1,800 
permits.41 When the other European countries appeared lukewarm to the Dutch proposal it 
was quickly dropped.42 This greater generosity towards transit-refugees soon disappeared 
when it became apparent that it was extremely difficult to get watertight guarantees that such 
refugees would receive all the necessary papers and be prepared to move on. In Switzerland 
the entry of transit refugees was soon further restricted. In December 1938 all three 
Scandinavian states curtailed their facilities for transit refugees and the Netherlands followed 
suit at the turn of the year.43 These changes were sometimes justified on the spurious 
grounds that the treatment of Jews had improved and that immigration controls could now be 
‘normalized’.44  
In total contradiction to this claim that the Jews were exposed to fewer dangers inside 
Germany, several countries decided during November 1938 to make unaccompanied Jewish 
children eligible for admission. The schemes to bring children to Western Europe epitomised 
the hopeless situation for ‘Jews’ in Greater Germany. Terrorised parents realized that their 
children’s only hope of survival was in the hands of strangers. Jewish refugee organisation 
convinced various Western European governments to give their agreement to this rescue 
operation by referring to the precedent of the protection afforded to children during the 
Spanish Civil War. Ultimately, Switzerland and France took in a few hundred children each 
and Belgium and Denmark provided asylum to a thousand apiece while the Dutch record 
was more generous as the Netherlands accepted two thousand children.45 The very limited 
initiatives by Continental European states for actively rescuing Jews from Greater Germany - 
initiatives which in any case did not last very long - are partly reflected in the figures 
indicating the Jewish refugees’ official destination when they applied for a passports in 
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Vienna and Prague. As shown in table 3 only 10% of the passport applicants stated they they 
were leaving for a liberal state in Continental Europe.  
 
Table 3: ‘Jewish’ refugees’ official destination when applying for passports in Vienna and 
Prague (n=102.897 (with Bohemia and Moravia included n=111.666))46  
 Austria 
(2.5.1938-
31.7.1939) 
Included 
Bohemia and 
Moravia (15.3-
27.7.1939) 
Percentage in total delivered 
passports 
Great Britain 22.680 28.449 25% 
France 3041 3382 3% 
Only Austria 
Switzerland 3021  3% 
Belgium 1680  1,6% 
Netherlands 1502  1,5% 
Denmark 464  0,5% 
Luxemburg 96  0,1%  
 
 
Border controls that had already been strengthened during the course of 1938 became even 
more stringent. In November 1938 detention stations were set up on the French frontier to 
deal with illegal immigrants. At the French border among the uninvited immigrants only 
‘refugees’ were to be admitted. An alternative for male refugees denied protection at the 
border was to volunteer for the French Foreign Legion, but due the high physical standards 
required to qualify as volunteer only a few hundred (‘Jewish’) refugees who put themselves 
forward were allowed entry into France.47 In April 1939, controls were strengthened at the 
Italian-French border. Twelve pelotons of the Garde Mobile were deployed along the 
coastline. They were even active on the Mediterranean Sea and used fast boats, equipped 
with heavy lights to intercept vessels at night.48 In the Netherlands, 1000 border guards were 
made available to defend the 888 km frontier. Those in charge claimed that it would actually 
need 18-20,000 men to patrol it properly, but the civil servants, ever anxious to try and 
restrict expenditure, leapt at the idea of a more flexible employment of border personnel. 
From January 1939, men could be removed from areas where illegal entry was uncommon 
and redeployed as ‘flying detachments' that could be moved to more critical areas.49  
Inevitably, large numbers of refugees were turned away at the borders.50 In countries 
with a visa requirement, whether for all Germans or only for German Jews, policy dictated 
that all those without the proper documentation should be refused entry. In Luxemburg, the 
Netherlands and Denmark, where there was no formal visa requirement, the J-stamped 
passport served as a filter. This became the main criteria by which would-be immigrants 
were screened. However, even people carrying regular German passports were not always 
granted admission. Dutch instructions to the border guards on 17 October 1938 stipulated 
that German Jews without a J-stamp on their passport had to be refused admission, as their 
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documents were not valid. In February 1939, high-ranking officers expressed regret that it 
was difficult to stop catholic spouses of ‘Jewish’ refugees at the border, as they legitimately 
had no red ‘J’ in their passports. As border guards could still not always distinguish easily 
between potential refugees and others, they had to stop or delay many other travellers.51 In 
Denmark it appears that the border guards continued to identify unwanted entrants in an 
impressionistic way and questioned those whose presumed semitic facial features or strange 
travel patterns made them suspect as people wanting to settle in Denmark.52 
In 1939 border controls in Western Europe were intensified to keep out unwanted 
refugees. In December 1938, French border guards had been specifically instructed to refuse 
entry to German Jewish children and in January 1939 the Belgian authorities followed suit. 
The Dutch, Danish and Swiss authorities were ready to do the same, but there were no 
formal instructions.53 Transit refugees who had a steamship ticket and an entrance visa for a 
country overseas were usually allowed to enter the countries bordering Germany to embark 
at a Dutch, Belgian or French port, but supporting their ports and shipping lines did not imply 
that the authorities acknowledged the refugees’ plight. From April 1939 onwards, France 
insisted that transit refugees were transported from the border to the ports under police 
surveillance.54   
Attitudes at the border oscillated between outright refusal of entry for all Germans 
with a J-passport and a more differentiated policy that examined the merits of individual 
cases. Luxembourg and Switzerland were the first countries to institute a blanket policy. 
From the middle of August 1938 onwards, the Swiss and Luxemburg authorities had adopted 
restrictive measures at the border and these were extended in Switzerland on 7 September 
and in Luxemburg shortly after the Kristallnacht, on 25 November 1938 so that both borders 
was closed altogether for ‘Jewish’ refugees.55 Denmark took a very similar position, but the 
Netherlands initially retained a case-by-case approach that did not automatically exclude 
‘Jews’. Until the Kristallnacht the Netherlands had admitted German refugees with papers 
and means to assure their upkeep, and even those without papers had been admitted if they 
could prove they were in imminent mortal danger. In the aftermath of the Kristallnacht, even 
this criterion was amended. A circular from the Ministry of Justice made it clear that only 
those German refugees (with or without papers) who lived close to the Dutch border and 
could prove imminent mortal danger were henceforward to be admitted. Moreover, as with 
previous instructions, the terms of the directive were not to be made public lest they 
provoked a wave of new immigration from q`ualified' people. The only others with some 
chance of admission were those with family already in the Netherlands, people 
recommended by one of the relief agencies, and children. A month later, the Dutch 
government radically altered its border policy and decided that the sheer numbers being 
admitted could no longer be sustained. On 17 December 1938 the Minister of Justice gave 
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orders for the border to be closed except for those Jews whom the Dutch authorities had 
already given permission to enter.56 This implied that henceforward only those with existing 
permits would be admitted and that all others would be refused at the border. This regulation 
effectively introduced a visa-like system for Jewish refugees from Germany and to some 
extent informally duplicated Swiss practice. Now even Jewish refugees with sufficient means 
of support were no longer admitted. Only those who could demonstrate mortal danger (and 
until March 1939, unaccompanied women and children) were to be exempted. In fact this 
meant that only political refugees were to be admitted. Soon thereafter the Dutch authorities 
re-examined the effectiveness of their expulsion policy in the border region. By January 1939 
the Minister of Justice Goseling decided that the practice of merely returning the refugees 
arrested in the border region was to no avail. These expellees just came back and thus an 
formal extradition mechanism along the lines of the Dutch-German agreement of 1906 would 
be more efficient.57      
The tightening of remote and border control had the effect of increasing the number 
of refugees using smugglers.58 The huge profits to be made in the clandestine transport of 
people as well as goods across frontiers meant that by 1939 smuggling had become 
increasingly modernised and almost professionalised. For example, bigger and faster 
motorboats replaced the traditional fishing boats of Ventimiglia and San Remo that had been 
used for smuggling ‘Jews’ from Italy into France in 1938. Action was taken against these 
human smugglers. Known smugglers were often prohibited from entering border regions and 
their travel documents were confiscated. Even repressive means were used: helping illegal 
aliens was criminalized in several countries and the judiciary used newly acquired powers to 
imprison smugglers or to confiscate their boats or cars.59 The Belgian authorities relied 
mainly on the cooperation of the German authorities to stop the traffic. Known Belgian 
smugglers were, at the request of the Belgian authorities, refused entry to Germany, but 
more co-operation was sought. Drawing on the German-Belgian agreement of 22 October 
1938, the Belgian authorities insisted that German authorities take steps to punish human 
smugglers.60 The Germans complied and from March 1939 onwards, those caught with 
‘Jewish’ would-be emigrants in the border regions of Western Germany were sent to 
concentration camps.61 These higher risks for smugglers drove prices up even more and 
thus made this criminal trade even more lucrative for those prepared to take the risks. 
Whatever state responses were to the threat of illegal immigration, borders remained 
permeable and many people were still able to slip through. The refugees from Nazi Germany 
were highly motivated and ready to make almost any sacrifice in order to cross frontiers. 
Human traffickers, in their turn motivated by the high profits involved, often anticipated 
changes made by the authorities. For example in the spring of 1939 with heightened control 
of the sea route across the Italian-French border, illegal immigration from Italy shifted to the 
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mountain passes that were more difficult to monitor.62 Each month several thousand 
refugees still succeeded in crossing the German borders illegally to look for asylum in the 
liberal countries bordering Nazi Germany (see graph 2).  
 
Internal control  
 
During the course of 1938, the combination of remote and border controls had been 
supplemented with an increased level of internal control on refugees who had arrived in West 
Europe. The very restrictive immigration policies across Europe inadvertently brought about 
a shift in the nature of immigration. Refugees continued to arrive as the pressures on ‘Jews’ 
in Germany to leave remained unabated, but the immigration of refugees became framed in 
terms of illegality and criminality. Smugglers were the conduits for refugees to cross frontiers, 
but once in a country of refuge, other supports were available to help people hide from the 
authorities. In effect, the inflow of refugees had been partly driven underground and states 
now assumed that there were large numbers of refugees living illegally in the country and 
escaping any control. The authorities’ imperfect knowledge of their alien population meant 
that they were unable to assess the dangers to which society was exposed. These unknown 
aliens and the supposed abuse of the hospitality given to the legalised refugees became 
another obsession. Internal controls were intensified in order to control all immigrants and in 
particular to track down all undocumented refugees.63 It became even more difficult for 
refugees to enter the territory of West European countries uninvited although the exception 
was the continued granting of asylum to political refugees, including communists. France 
remained the country of asylum par excellence for these political refugees. This is illustrated 
by the dispersal of a sample of communist refugees within Europe as shown by table 4.   
 
 
Table 4: Country of asylum of a sample of 333 German communists, 1938-1939.64 
 1938 1939  1938 1939 
France 95 107 Denmark  18 19 
Great Britain 14 28 Switzerland 13 12 
USSR 39 31 Netherlands 11 17 
Spain 47 20 Belgium  7 7 
 
 
The predominance of France as country of asylum for German communists was 
mainly due to their flight from Spain after the civil war. The remnants of the International 
Brigades, some of whom had previously been refugees in other countries neighbouring 
Germany, found their only escape route across the Pyrenees with the hundreds of thousands 
of Spaniards fleeing in the same direction. Most were interned in camps but a few communist 
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activists were allowed to leave the French camps and settle elsewhere, for example in 
Belgium and Great Britain where they had been offered hospitality. At the same time, the 
USSR became less important as a country of asylum, mainly due to its isolated political 
position and the murder of German communists during the Stalinist purges.65  
‘Jewish’ refugees who had succeeded in entering the territory of the liberal states, 
either legally or illegally, remained the main targets of restrictive measures. In Belgium, the 
publicity given to the deportation of illegal entrants in early October 1938 had led to 
widespread public discussion but the debate was radically altered by the wave of solidarity 
shown to the victims of the ReichsKristallnacht. Reluctantly, but provoked by the hard-line 
attitudes of Minister of Justice Pholien, more and more politicians publicly advocated a more 
humanitarian immigration policy. On 22 November 1938, under enormous Parliamentary 
pressure, Pholien finally made public the fact that the forced repatriation of Jewish refugees 
had been suspended. German Jews were again given temporary protection in order to 
prepare their re-emigration, but as they were prohibited from any economic activity, they 
usually had to be supported by Jewish refugee welfare organisations.66  
Dutch policy changed as radically. From May 1938 onwards, those who entered the 
country illegally were supposed to be deported, but this stopped on 19 November.67 During 
November and December 1938, 1,500 illegal entrants were granted temporary protection. 
Initially they had to report daily to the police, but were subsequently placed under close 
administrative supervision in camps at Veenhuizen and Hoek van Holland. Transfer to the 
camps was often delayed, as there were insufficient places for the numbers involved.68At the 
same time, prospects for re-emigration were shrinking as refugees found it increasingly 
difficult to gain admission overseas and on 17 December 1938 the Dutch Minister of Justice 
closed the border, which implied that refugees who had entered the country illegally would be 
escorted back to Germany. Indeed, Dutch practice and the terms of the Dutch-German 
agreement of 1906, dictated that illegal aliens were subject not just to expulsion, but also to 
repatriation. This began immediately after Christmas when 70 refugees were sent back in a 
bus from Amsterdam to Germany. This repatriation policy for (‘Jewish’) refugees meant that 
in Dutch eyes, charges of smuggling, tax evasion or Rassenschande (race defilement), 
threatened sterilization or even internment in a concentration camp might not be considered 
prima facie grounds for protection.69 
By the end of 1938, every Continental European country had its own pool of 
u`ndesirable' refugees. There was no question of their being collectively dumped across 
another frontier for fear of creating diplomatic difficulties or tit-for-tat retaliation. Dumping 
refugees into neighbouring countries became increasingly difficult. Legal re-migration was 
possible, but proceeded at a slow pace. Figures for HICEM-sponsored travel from Western 
Europe gives a good indication of the nature of re-emigration (graph 4 and 5). In the first 7 
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months of 1939, 4,000 refugees re-emigrated under the auspices of HICEM, mainly to the 
US, but others left independently or used private agencies. Another possible avenue was to 
make use of the various Zionist organisations that were involved in schemes for illegal 
emigration to Palestine. Much to the disgust of the British, these were often tolerated by 
Western European states anxious to encourage refugees to leave. London even accused 
their continental neighbours of conniving with the Zionists in order to get rid of as many 
refugees as possible.70 In practice, there seems to have been no active co-operation, but 
turning a blind eye to Zionist smuggling activities seems to have been common.  
Three types of solution can be identified as having been tried by the states of 
Western Europe in 1939. Belgium was unique in continuing to provide temporary protection 
to all refugees entering its territory. The Danish, Luxemburg and Swiss responses were the 
exact opposite. ‘Jewish’ refugees were considered as illegal aliens and forced repatriation 
was used as a remedy. In between these two extremes, the Dutch and French response to 
refugees was more ambivalent, with some afforded temporary protection, either freely or 
interned in prisons and camps, while other were deported. 
 
Belgian retention of a humanitarian immigration policy 
 
After Minister of Justice Joseph Pholien had announced in Parliament that deportation of 
Jewish refugees had been suspended, about two thousand ‘Jewish’ refugees arrived illegally 
in Belgium every month (graph 2). Upon registration they were granted a temporary 
residence permit as refugees in transit. No German ‘Jews’ were recorded as being 
repatriated between November 1938 and August 1939. The scope of persecution qualifying 
for protection was also extended: denationalized Polish Jews were also considered refugees 
worthy of temporary protection.71 The head of the Belgian Sûreté, Robert de Foy, insisted 
that the Ministers in charge of immigration policy stop the flood and expel all the illegal 
entrants. The regular cabinet reshuffles and the fear that intervening in this delicate and 
polarized matter would make one a second Pholien, was a recipe for inertia. The expulsion of 
‘Jewish’ refugees became a taboo for a long time to come and three successive Catholic 
Ministers of Justice between November 1938 and March 1939 refused to take any initiatives 
on the matter.  
The eligibility procedure used by the advisory refugee commission continued to 
distinguish between the ‘voluntary’ flight of the Jews from the ‘forced’ flight of political 
opponents. Although by 1938 both groups were subject to the same kind of brutal treatment 
that endangered their freedom and their lives, the criteria remained unaltered. In view of this 
unjustified discrimination it was suggested in early 1939 that Belgium should withdraw from 
the international refugee regime, but as the convention of 1938 left substantial discretion to 
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the national authorities it was considered unnecessary to do so.72 The artificial distinction 
between the ‘Jewish’ and political refugees could be justified by the claim of the authorities 
that ‘Jewish’ refugees had no need for protection as they had no intention of settling in 
Belgium. Moreover, the refugee commission, a state institution that had the task of 
guaranteeing that Belgian alien policy met minimum humanitarian standards, did not oppose 
the political decision to exclude ‘Jewish’ refugees from the eligibility procedure and thus 
undermined its own prerogatives. The possibility for immigrants to apply for asylum, even if 
they had arrived illegally, was a principle fully entrenched in Belgian legislation since 1936, 
but ‘Jewish’ refugees were collectively excluded from the privileged category of immigrants 
whom the Belgian authorities could not, on principle, expel. In this way, the Belgian state 
retained the right to expel ‘Jews’ fleeing Nazi Germany. This 'statutory inferiority' conferred 
on the ‘Jewish’ refugees, an expression of the power of definition this independent asylum 
agency held, also served to undermine the validity of their reasons for leaving Nazi Germany. 
By denying  “Jews’ refugee status, the Belgian authorities had a big stick at their disposal to 
coerce German Jewish transit refugees into organising their re-emigration although no 
‘Jewish’ refugees were actually expelled from Belgian territory. The fact that the refugee 
commission did not adjust its criteria to reflect the changing circumstances in Nazi Germany 
meant that couples in ‘racially-mixed’ marriages remained the only victims of Nazi racial 
policy eligible for protection. These Rassenschande applicants were the only ‘Jewish’ 
refugees whose asylum applications were still processed.  
As more and more countries overseas closed their borders, ‘transit’ became largely a 
fiction. Belgian refugee aid committees made a great show of those ‘Jews’ who did depart 
overseas as it proved to public opinion that their refugees had not come to stay indefinitely. 
In the spring of 1939, when re-emigration had all but come to a halt, the main Jewish refugee 
organisation was so desperate to prove that ‘Jewish’ refugees who were temporarily 
protected in Belgium were still leaving that it tried to set up a cosmetic operation with Great 
Britain by pretending that German ‘Jews’ who had been selected in Germany for protection in 
Britain had actually been transit refugees in Belgium. Even the issue of camps for refugees 
made no headway. A refugee camp had been erected in Merksplas accommodating around 
500 refugees. This first camp had been created to enable the refugee committees to save 
money and to enhance the chances of refugees finding a country of final settlement through 
the provision of occupational training. Segregating refugees in camps gave the refugees the 
clear message that they had not come to stay and most importantly it diminished their 
visibility. After October 1938 there were no further initiatives as the authorities considered 
that financing the restructuring of government property to create refugee camps went beyond 
the limits of a ‘reasonable’ refugee policy. The welfare of refugees had to remain the task of 
private charities. 
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The contradictions in these various policy strands meant that refugee policy became 
deadlocked. The Jewish relief committees had given the government assurances that no 
refugees would become public charges but the influx had continued unabated and the sheer 
weight of numbers had overwhelmed their financial resources. In April 1939, a new cabinet 
agreed to share the costs for the upkeep of Jewish refugees. In spite of intensifying 
xenophobia, there was a consensus among all the traditional political parties that repatriating 
Jewish refugees was impossible, even if this meant that their upkeep had to be partly 
subsidised by the Belgian treasury. The authorities were thus ‘forced’ into co-financing 
refugee relief and as this was more efficiently done in camps, the authorities quickly opened 
a second camp with 500 places and the Merksplas camp was enlarged to accommodate 700 
people.73 
 
Deporting Refugees: Jews perceived as illegal immigrants  
 
In Denmark and Switzerland the deportation of Jewish refugees continued unabated 
throughout 1939.74 Between 1 March and 1 September 1939, 26 of the 70 Jewish refugees 
who had arrived illegally and 30 of around 700 who had entered Denmark legally were 
repatriated to Germany. These repatriations, which were sometimes contested by the 
refugee committees, were mostly due to misdemeanours committed by the individual or their 
failure to find a country willing to offer them permanent asylum. There was no attempt to 
disguise the nature of these expulsions, and by 1939 Minister of Justice Karl Steincke was 
justifying them by denying that those involved were refugees and by condemning the 
offences they had committed. The Danish-Jewish relief committee took a very pragmatic 
attitude to this restrictive policy. Henceforward the committee only protected those ‘Jewish’ 
refugees who could soon emigrate overseas and therefore only needed short-term support. 
As a rule, this protection usually insured the individual from deportation, but this was not 
always the case. Some people were being repatriated before they could contact the Jewish 
relief committee and sometimes even the committee’s support could not prevent the Danish 
authorities from deporting refugees.75  
   In Switzerland, ‘Jews’ continued to enter the country illegally although the border had 
been closed for ‘Jewish’ refugees from 9 September 1938. As Regula Ludi writes, local 
officials could sometimes circumvent the intentions of federal policy. The case of the police 
chief of St. Gallen, Paul Grüninger is the most well-known example. He took a number of 
steps to prevent people being sent back, including antedating documents, thereby allowing, 
according to Stefan Keller 3,601 ‘Jews’ to enter Switzerland. The cantons Basel-Stadt and 
Schaffhausen, where social democrats had a substantial influence on policy are other cases 
in point. Much to the annoyance of the federal authorities, these cantonal authorities largely 
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stuck to the principle that once a ‘Jewish’ refugee had outwitted the federal and cantonal 
border guards and succeeded in entering the city of Basel or Schaffhausen they could be 
permitted to remain temporarily.76 Nonetheless, the stringent Swiss border controls (assisted 
by the Germans) kept most ‘Jewish’ refugees away from Switzerland. By 1939 the few who 
did succeed in entering Swiss territory illegally were nearly all deported. The few cantonal 
authorities that advocated a more humane treatment of these refugees were placed under 
enormous pressure to toe the line by the federal authorities, but this was ultimately achieved 
by an increased centralisation of more and more issues related to asylum policy.77  
Deportation also remained an instrument of migration control in France and the 
Netherlands. In the latter country, the only information on how this was administered comes 
from the police in Amsterdam, who seem to have taken a strict line. Many ‘Jewish’ refugees 
were forcibly repatriated and from 27 March 1939 even single women and children were no 
longer exempted from this process.78 The Amsterdam figures indicate that although 
unauthorized immigration did not stop altogether, the number of recorded arrivals was 
drastically reduced.79 The Dutch-Jewish welfare organisations’ statistics on new arrivals in 
1939 demonstrate that not all of them were forcibly removed from the Netherlands, although 
in contrast to Belgium, the authorities did not explicitly tolerate them. The basic criterion for 
being tolerated was that the refugee had to be in (imminent) mortal danger. Extreme left 
political refugees who had entered illegally were exempted from deportation but those 
persecuted in Germany for crimes such as currency smuggling and Rassenschande were 
not granted asylum, as the Dutch did not interpret confinement in a concentration camp as 
constituting mortal danger. Dutch local authorities nevertheless continued to have 
considerable discretion in their actions. They were the ones to investigate the danger to 
which a deportee would be exposed. Only in cases of refugees fleeing charges of currency 
smuggling did deportation have to be the rule. The dangers to an illegal immigrant as a result 
of charges of Rassenschande and the dangers of a stay in a concentration camp were thus 
often investigated on a case-by-case basis.80 
It seems that in line with tradition, the French authorities seldom resorted to 
deportation but policy did become far more heterogeneous.81 The decree of May 1938 had 
given the prefects power to expel aliens who had entered illegally or overstayed the validity 
of their visas whereas previously this had required ministerial approval. According to a British 
Passport control officer in Paris, the treatment of refugees in France lacked uniformity as 
there seemed to be little or no co-ordination among the provincial préfets who were entrusted 
with this work and who seemed to put all sorts of different interpretations on the regulations, 
resulting sometimes in unwarranted severity and at other times in the granting of 
unintentionally generous facilities.82  
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Deterring Refugees: French prisons and Dutch camps  
 
The French authorities largely refrained from deporting refugees, but Vicki Caron points out 
the French authorities believed that prison would deter illegal immigration and even the 
ReichsKristallnacht did not alter this policy. Refugees arriving illegally were still treated on a 
par with criminals. According to estimates from the Jewish refugee committee, about 9,000 
refugees had been sentenced to terms of imprisonment between May 1938 and July 1939, 
including about 3,000 Germans.83 However, the implementation of this policy was not without 
its problems. Equating illegal immigrants with criminals had considerable disadvantages. 
Holding them in a high security facility was expensive and applying criminal procedures to 
refugees was ineffective. As Vicki Caron illustrates, invoking the law could be an impediment 
to a repressive policy as the courts showed considerable leniency in applying such laws.  
Prisons remained the ‘French home’ for refugees, but elsewhere in continental 
Europe, refugee camps were increasingly created to house new arrivals. Jewish refugee 
committees in Switzerland and Belgium, in close co-operation with the authorities, had during 
the moments of intense crisis in migration management, established a few camps to 
accommodate refugees in a more cost-effective way. In general authorities were reluctant to 
follow this example as the refugee camps were presumed to send a message that refugees 
were welcome to stay. However when the xenophobic mood among the French political elite 
waned, several refugee camps were set up in the course of 1939 where vocational training 
was provided, financed by the Jewish refugee committees.84  
However, another kind of refugee camp was piloted in France and pursued with more 
vigour in the Netherlands. A French decree in May 1938 had deemed that prison was 
inappropriate for aliens who could not be deported, and such people had instead to be given 
an assigned residence under police supervision. As the ruling elite of that time had embarked 
on a conservative backlash against the Popular Front, the containment of subversive aliens 
was given a high priority. Also appeasement was still considered the best defence of French 
interests and the mere presence of the refugees, let alone their political activities, were 
considered an annoying impediment to French-German reconciliation.85 The extensive use of 
close supervision of refugees rapidly got out of control as the Minister of Justice had to 
reprimand the préfets in November 1938 for their excessive zeal in using this means to 
supervise all kinds of refugees. As too many refugees were put under police supervision, 
local gendarmes were overwhelmed by increase in work.86 An emergency decree of 12 
November 1938 enabled the executive to arbitrarily detain foreigners who constituted a 
‘security risk’ in camps.  As the executive received full power to deal with foreigners as it saw 
fit, it allowed the rule of law to be bypassed.87  
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When in January 1939, 400,000 Republican refugees fled into France, the French 
authorities had to improvise emergency aid. All Spanish refugees were interned in makeshift 
camps and pressured to return to Spain. These camps were a solution to a very exceptional 
situation, but the experiment seems to have been considered successful.88 In February 1939 
a much more calculated decision was taken to erect a camp in Rieucros (Lozère) for 
undesirable refugees who could not be deported with a capacity for 500 inmates. 
Immediately forty foreigners were interned there for an indeterminate period. German and 
Austrian refugees together with some Spaniards, Italians and Russians, most of whom had 
long criminal records, were thus rendered totally subject to the power of the administration. 
Although this camp remained an exception at that time, it would become the French tool for 
migration management from September 1939 onwards.89 
In the Netherlands, the internment of refugees was already in full swing by 1939. The 
practice of interning so-called dangerous foreigners had been initiated in 1935 using powers 
obtained by the Dutch authorities in 1918. It was continued in the following years and 
refugees were invariably interned if it was felt that they were a danger to public order. At the 
end of 1938, the scale of internment grew dramatically (see table 5). From December 
onwards, all male refugees arriving in the Netherlands illegally or legally, were 
accommodated in camps scattered across the Dutch countryside. When they arrived, legal 
immigrants had to agree to be housed in camps financed by the Jewish refugee aid 
committee. Special camps for illegally immigrated refugees were established under the aegis 
of the Ministry of Justice with a far stricter regime. Only men were interned, so families were 
separated. Inmates of these camps were not allowed to go out, or to receive visits.90  
 
Table 5: Number of refugee interned in Dutch camps for legally and illegally immigrated 
refugees91 
 Inmates in camps for illegally 
immigrated refugees 
(inmates of Jewish religion)  
Inmates in camps for legally 
immigrated refugees 
By  31 December 
1938 
717 348 
January 1939 (571)  
February 651 (638) 807 
March 675 (658) 898 
April 686 (665) 754 
May 666 (640) 743 
June 665 (645) 886 
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July (672) 790 
August 1939 (547) 731 
 
These penal colonies attracted criticism even within government circles as it was 
argued that the 1918 law provided for full powers to confine dangerous aliens, but these 
refugees were harmless and were only distinguishable from refugees who had entered 
legally by their means of entry into the country. Their internment was considered an 
excessive interpretation of the powers given to the executive, but the Minister of Justice 
insisted that because there could be undesirable elements among the refugees that 
internment was necessary.92 The existing small camps were difficult to supervise and 
expensive, and it was decided, mainly on economic grounds, that a central camp - 
Westerbork - was a better option. Also the costs of the camps for illegal refugees were borne 
by the guarantee fund established by the refugee committees, in spite of the fact that the 
committees had no control over the arrival of inmates.93  
 
Great-Britain, a pro-active refugee policy 
 
After the Munich agreements, the British authorities gradually developed a more proactive 
refugee policy. As Arieh Sherman wrote, ‘the moral ambiguities of the British position at 
Munich made the pressures on the Government to intervene more actively on behalf of these 
refugees well-nigh irresistible’.94 At first, Britain had considered protective measures within 
the borders of the truncated Czechoslovak state but the negative attitude of the 
Czechoslovak authorities towards ethnic minorities pushed emigration to the fore as an 
alternative solution. In November 1938 the British government decided to grant asylum to 
350 refugees and their families who were in imminent danger in Czechoslovakia. This 
number increased rapidly and by April 1939 between 2,000 and 3,000 persons benefited 
from this proactive refugee policy. This British readiness to accept refugees from 
Czechoslovakia did not deviate much from the minor humanitarian concessions made to the 
British immigration policy in the past. They received only a three-month temporary residence 
permit in expectation that they would re-emigrate elsewhere and all the costs involved were 
met by private relief organisations. 
The first British quota of 350 was apportioned with two-thirds going to refugees who 
had just fled from the Sudetenland and one-third to refugees who had arrived in 
Czechoslovakia from Germany and Austria at an earlier date. The British refugee 
organisations in Czechoslovakia were asked to draw up a priority list of the most threatened 
individuals. Thus far, the British authorities had seen to it that asylum was not granted to 
communists, and although they wished to maintain this policy of exclusion, the refugee 
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organisations had considerable left-wing representation and insisted that their rankings were 
respected. As a result, London finally accepted that communists were also to be included in 
those granted protection and to veil this far-reaching concession it was decided that only 
(communist) ‘extremists’ would be excluded. This excluded category seems not to have been 
used later on. Since 1917, Britain had been anything but welcoming to communist refugees, 
even temporarily, but their admission on condition that they would not engage in political 
activity was now accepted as the logical consequence of a more proactive refugee policy.95 
Thus, Great Britain became a more important place of asylum for communist refugees than 
in the preceding years (see table 4). In the course of 1939, the British authorities were 
‘forced’ to make their proactive refugee policy even more generous. As it turned out to be 
difficult to find a country willing to receive the temporarily protected refugees the average 
residence permits for transit refugees from Czechoslovakia were ‘perforce’ extended from 3 
to 6 months in March 1939. From January 1939 onwards, the British subsidised refugee re-
emigration. The money was taken from the £4 million which London had promised as 
financial support to Czechoslovakia. From this refugee fund, money could be taken only to 
arrange a permanent settlement elsewhere. The costs of temporary relief inside the United 
Kingdom continued to be met by charitable organisations.  
Besides the above-mentioned organized immigration, there was also a spontaneous 
movement of Czech refugees posing as tourists. Possessing only a passport and some 
financial means, they could gain access to Great Britain. Yet, soon after September 1938, 
fears that refugees masquerading as tourists might try to settle meant that all Czechs were 
subjected to close scrutiny and interrogation at the ports of entry.96 Immediately after the 
occupation of Bohemia-Moravia on 15 March 1939, the regulations were relaxed and 
refugees from Czechoslovakia who had fled immediately after the invasion of Prague and 
had succeeded in reaching British ports were usually granted admission if they possessed a 
valid passport. Thus, between September 1938 and April 1939, some 1,500 Czechs were 
given asylum in Great Britain of whom about a thousand were Jews, but others were turned 
away. The heavily publicised case of a group of ‘Jewish’ refugees from the protectorate who 
flew into Croydon airport from Warsaw on 31 March 1939 on a chartered plane and were 
immediately returned to Warsaw sent a clear message. This forcible return of Czech Jews 
had immediate repercussions on the continent. The Dutch authorities refused further 
passage to Czech ‘Jews’ travelling on trains from the protectorate to Dutch ports. These 
‘Jews’ were ostensibly on their way to England, but in spite of direct intervention of the British 
Committee for Refugees from Czechoslovakia (BCRC) with the Dutch border officials, only a 
small number were allowed to cross into the Netherlands at Oldenzaal and most were left 
stranded in Bentheim on the German side of the border.97 
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After the introduction of a visa requirement for people from the protectorate in April 
1939, the process of pre-selection could be applied as an administrative routine to Czech 
refugees. When such refugees presented themselves at British ports of entry they could be 
refused admission if they did not have the necessary documents – just like their German or 
Austrian counterparts. The British authorities wanted to pre-select the refugees they 
admitted. From April 1939 onwards, British refugee policy explicitly extended its target group 
to ethnic Czechs and Czech ‘Jews’.98 The BCRC set up reception and clearing stations in 
Poland to select refugees who had fled the protectorate. Warsaw had agreed to admit 
illegally immigrating refugees provided that they departed quickly. Once arrived in Great 
Britain, the BCRC – for the first time in the history of British refugee policy – could apply for 
public funds to finance the (temporary) relief of these refugees. British groups supporting 
non-Jewish refugees argued that it was only their work that was truly resistance to Nazi 
Germany’s policies. Help for Czech Jews to emigrate obviously played into the hands of the 
Nazis who wanted to purge the (Czech) protectorate of all its Jews. Berlin even proposed 
cooperation with the British authorities in this matter. The British rescue operation for those in 
danger in Czechoslovakia became exclusively focused on helping political refugees. The 
British acknowledgement of responsibility for the victims of the Munich agreement seemed to 
have had no advantages for Czech Jews, as they continued to be treated on a par with the 
Jews still residing in Germany or Austria and this in contrast to their politically active 
countrymen.  
 
After Kristallnacht, ‘Jewish’ refugees in Germany and Austria also benefited from a 
more generous immigration policy. This liberalisation of entry for ‘Jewish’ refugees from 
greater Germany remained almost exclusively dependent on private Jewish finances. By this 
stage, Neville Chamberlain, the British Prime Minister, had effectively given up all hope of 
moderating this aspect of Nazi policy and had assumed that the continuing pauperisation and 
expulsion of the Jews was irreversible. There was no doubt in his mind that the solution to 
the refugee question could only be found in the United States. He took the view that Great 
Britain could not cope with the massive inflow of refugees, and any increase in the quotas for 
Palestine was politically unacceptable. He was also convinced that the United States could 
only be persuaded to open its doors if it realised that there was no European solution to the 
problem. These political and humanitarian considerations explain Chamberlain’s decision to 
grant temporary protection to considerably more refugees from Nazi Germany in Great 
Britain. Concessions were made to children and (female) workers prepared to become 
domestic servants.99 In this manner about 10.000 children and 13.000, almost exclusively 
female, refugees had been admitted by September 1939. Both schemes officially offered 
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only temporary protection, but these refugees were admitted for longer periods and the 
authorities were prepared to consider applications for permanent residence.  
Chamberlain’s decision meant that Britain was prepared to be far more generous in 
granting temporary asylum for ‘Jewish’ refugees, but the principles established in 1933 
remained intact: relief measures for transit refugees and the costs of their journey to a final 
country of asylum were not to be at the expense of the public purse, but met either by the 
refugees themselves, or by private charities. This somewhat undermined any flood of 
refugees to the United Kingdom. From the Anschluss onwards, Anglo-Jewish relief 
organisations had limited their role to that of mediator between individual sponsors and 
candidate-refugees in Germany and Austria. This process of selective immigration was 
speeded-up from November 1938 onwards as more civil servants were deployed to handle 
the visa applications. At the same time, the criteria for being granted temporary asylum were 
drastically reduced. Thus, it was no longer necessary to provide evidence of imminent re-
emigration and sometimes the mere fact that the applicant was deemed physically and 
socially suitable for re-emigration was considered sufficient. Recommendations from a 
refugee aid organisation became accepted as a substitute for official individual inquiries. 
Thus receiving a British visa became largely a decision taken by the relief organisations and 
the individual sponsors, who, after all, took on the financial responsibility for the persons they 
selected.100  
 
The Jewish relief organisations concentrated their efforts almost exclusively on 
German (and Austrian) Jews while Czech Jews could not count on their support. The latter 
were not considered the responsibility of the British Jews, but of the British government 
because the British authorities had accepted responsibility for victims of the Munich 
agreement by providing the resources for their re-emigration, and from April 1939 onwards, 
also for their temporary relief in the United Kingdom. These refugees were referred to the 
BCRC. This organisation, officially non-sectarian, was mainly a creation of the left and its 
primary concern was with political activists. In agreement with the authorities, the BCRC thus 
privileged the political refugees, whereas Jews from Czechoslovakia were left in the cold. 
Nevertheless, the possibility of reaching Great Britain via Poland continued to act as a 
magnet for Jews in Czechoslovakia. British refugee aid committees were told to pass on the 
message that it was useless for ‘Jews’ from Czechoslovakia to escape to Poland, because 
they stood no chance of obtaining a visa for the United Kingdom. This selective solidarity 
with the victims of Munich was also conditioned by British loyalty to her Polish ally who had 
little enthusiasm for this inflow of ‘Jews’.101 The British authorities claimed it was imperative 
to relieve the pressure on the Polish borders because the continuing ‘Jewish’ emigration from 
Czechoslovakia might even pose a threat to the Polish-Jewish population. As a result of the 
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selective British refugee policy, the Polish authorities decided to give a clear signal to the 
‘Jews’ in Czechoslovakia by starting to turn ‘Jewish’ refugees away at the frontier and even 
to expel them.102  
By mid-May 1939, the BCRC had already brought 5,000 refugees to Great Britain, but 
there were very few Jews among them.103 In the battle for visas for Czechs, those 
representing the interests of Jewish refugees pointed out that there were many political 
activists among the ‘Jewish’ refugees in Poland and that they were in as much danger as 
activists of other ethnic groups from Czechoslovakia. The defence of the ‘Jewish’ refugees 
resulted in a serious crisis within the British refugee network. It was not until Czech Jews 
were represented in the selection committee that ‘Jewish’ Czechs were rescued through this 
operation.104 In line with the British refugee policy the selection of Czech Jews was mainly 
based on their prospects of permanent overseas residence. An additional criterion, 
introduced by the BCRC and which concurred with its conception of a refugee, was the social 
engagement of Jews. Only those Jews who had taken part in public life, be it through 
membership of a professional, women’s or youth organisation, could be selected for 
immigration.105 
According to Louise London and Arieh Sherman, refugees caught trying to evade 
British immigration control were severely dealt with. They base their judgment mainly on a 
few cases which had been heavily publicized, possibly as part of a deliberate public relations 
campaign. Indeed illegal refugees were prosecuted in the United Kingdom, but the judges 
usually imposed mild sentences, albeit with a recommendation that the accused should be 
deported after the sentences had been served.106 However, this was invariably back to their 
country of first asylum or to their point of departure, primarily the Netherlands, France or 
Belgium and not to Nazi Germany. In most cases, such people had crossed the Channel 
illegally, as stowaways on ships from European continental ports. Some even made the 
journey in their own boats, as was the case of two refugees who, in the summer of 1939, left 
Belgium for England in a ten-foot dinghy. 107 Although, as mentioned before, the first country 
of asylum was not necessarily a safe haven, deportation from Britain directly to Germany 
seems to have been out of the question. As far as we know there were no cases of refugees 
deported directly to Germany, a point reinforced by the contemporary assessment by S. 
Adler-Rudel of the Council for German Jewry:  
 
The judges usually criticized the immigrant for entering the country illegally and 
imposed mild sentences. In all cases, including those in which the Law forced the 
judge to recommend deportation, he pleaded for clemency and hoped the Home 
Office would not deport these persons, as no one can assume the responsibility of 
sending a person to Germany.108  
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The St Louis: An Exceptional Case? 
 
This overview of European refugee policy seems to contradict the most well-known episode 
in the rescue of German Jews from Nazi Germany in 1939: the saga of the St Louis. This 
story has been told many times in literature, in the press and in feature films, and underlines 
the myth of a generous European refugee policy. This ‘trip of shame’ is usually presented as 
a tribute to European solidarity with the refugees as opposed to American indifference.109 On 
13 May 1939, the St. Louis sailed out of the part of Hamburg with 931 passengers on board, 
nearly all of whom were ‘Jews’. They had purchased visas for Cuba, and hoped to find 
refuge in Havana. An economic crisis together with a corruption scandal in the immigration 
department caused a change in Cuban immigration policy on 5 May, but although the ship’s 
owners, HAPAG, had been informed of the changes, they did not stop the St Louis from 
leaving Hamburg. In the event, only a very few of the refugees were allowed to disembark in 
Havana and the remaining 907 passengers were refused entry as the Cuban authorities 
refused to honour the visas issued by their consuls in Germany. In spite of intensive 
negotiations by the major Jewish charities, no other American state was prepared to accept 
any of these refugees and the St Louis was ultimately forced to set sail back to Europe and 
was destined to return to Hamburg. In an attempt to prevent this, the JDC guaranteed to 
meet the costs of maintaining these people in any country ready to accept them, an 
undertaking discretely supported by the US State Department. Initially the British and French 
authorities, worried about setting a precedent, refused to co-operate as they considered calls 
to admit the St Louis passengers as giving in to German blackmail and a breach of the 
principle of pre-selecting refugees abroad.110 It was probably also in British and French 
minds to send yet another message to would-be refugees that there was no sense in arriving 
at the French or British border uninvited.    
In desperation, albeit with little hope, the JDC contacted Max Gottschalk, the 
president of the Jewish refugee committee in Brussels to see if Belgium would be ready to 
accept some passengers. On 10 June, Gottschalk obtained an agreement to take in 250 
refugees still on board of the St.Louis from the Belgian authorities.111 This decision remained 
confidential and the JDC then used it to lobby Belgium’s neighbours. Two days later, on 12 
June, the Dutch and French government also agreed to take in 194 and 250 Jews 
respectively. Britain was the last to follow and agreed to admit the remainder. Certainly the 
British and French, and even the Dutch had been dragged somewhat unwillingly into this 
rescue operation, their hand forced by Belgian generosity. The British belated acceptance 
was also motivated by the desire to save the US government and in the hope that this would 
be rewarded by the Americans accepting more of the ever-increasing numbers of transit 
refugees waiting in the United Kingdom. 
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The actual selection of passengers destined for each of the four receiving countries 
took place on board ship in Antwerp harbour. The discussions between the governments 
over which refugees they should take resulted in some acrimony. The instructions for each 
official delegation were very similar. The Dutch were to take only people with a real chance 
of emigration, the stateless had to be refused categorically, and the quota should contain as 
few Poles as possible. Getting away with less than 194 refugees would be appreciated too. 
The French wanted the majority of ‘their’ refugees to have US visas already in hand, while 
they refused to accept any Poles at all. By the same token, no country wanted to be saddled 
with an undue proportion of those who would be difficult to get rid of. The most desirable 
were those whose departure overseas was imminent. Different proposals on how to make 
the allocations were in circulation. One proposal was an arbitrary method of numerical 
selection. Another was to select on the basis of having friends or relatives in any of the four 
countries. This proposal emanated from the refugee aid organisations that wanted to 
minimize their expenses and was accepted. The British immediately produced a list of 
sponsors in Britain for 180 refugees which turned out to be the ones with the best prospects 
and best credentials. This skimming off the cream of the list produced protests from the other 
three countries. As a compromise, Belgium and the Netherlands did not take their full quota 
and Britain had to accept the final residue of ‘undesirables’ and thus a larger number of 
people than originally intended. Thus Britain ended up with 287 refugees and France 224, of 
whom 162 already possessed US visas. The Belgian group totalled 215 people and the 
Dutch took 181. When this last group arrived in Rotterdam, they were all placed in a 
temporary camp surrounded by guard dogs and barbed wire. The other groups fared 
somewhat better: In Belgium only those with no family in the country were housed in camps 
managed by the refugee committees. In France they were directed to an assigned residence 
in provincial refugee centres and in Britain they were housed privately.112 
The rescue of the St Louis refugees remained an exceptional operation. Immediately 
afterwards, the JDC issued a statement of policy declaring that it would not be in a position to 
offer similar guarantees again. The liberal European states also all made it clear that this was 
not to constitute a precedent for the future and no similar actions would be taken in any 
subsequent cases.113 And indeed, several other ships that had sailed in the expectation of 
dumping their ‘Jewish’ human cargoes were forced to return to Germany, thereby consigning 
their passengers to concentration camps. For these would-be refugees there was to be no 
international relief effort.114  
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In the summer of 1939 the pattern of immigration and asylum policies that had been 
established after the Kristallnacht changed. Belgium decided to follow Switzerland, 
Luxemburg and Denmark and to deport all (‘Jewish’) refugees entering the country illegally. 
The local refugee committees were convinced that the hardliners now had the upper hand in 
Belgium and there would be no duplication of Dutch and French ambivalence.115 At the same 
time, France and the Netherlands had pursued their own tortuous routes and both looked to 
soften their immigration policy. By the summer the French government was convinced that 
refugees could have some economic and military value, just like Frenchmen. The French 
authorities were more disposed to give a legal definition to the right of asylum and a decree 
dated 22 July 1939 to hold a census of all male refugees between 20 and 48 years of age 
was a clear step in this direction. This census had to list all foreigners protected in France 
and those refugees were to be summoned to perform some kind of French military service. 
The French authorities had not only to list those who had been qualified as ‘refugees’ and 
had received as such the right to stay in France, but also all those who because of the 
opinions they had expressed or the circumstances by which they had entered the country 
could be considered refugees. The stay of immigrants who were residing undocumented in 
France, but were categorized for this census as refugees would be legalized.116   
Likewise in the Netherlands, the hard line policy was brought into question. Although 
camps were still considered essential for immigration management and even greater powers 
of surveillance and control were given to the local authorities, changes in the other direction 
were also occurring. The Ministry of Justice was discussing the possibility of taking over the 
financing of the refugee camps with the Jewish refugee aid committee.117 More importantly, 
the Amsterdam police reached an agreement with the refugee committees that encouraged 
illegal refugees to register with the police in exchange for an undertaking that they would not 
be pursued and become liable for deportation. This, it was thought, would give the police 
more information and a better insight into the refugee population.118 It seems that even at 
cabinet level, the effectiveness of the hard-line policy was being questioned. In a confidential 
memorandum in July 1939, the Minister of Justice Goseling acknowledged that ‘in the 
present circumstances repatriations to Germany were inconvenient’ and secret instructions 
were issued which made it possible to systematically renew the residence permits of 
refugees on a monthly basis.119  
Changes in refugee policy during the summer of 1939 also occurred in the United 
Kingdom where, although refugees remained a privileged category, generosity was 
increasingly limited. Not only did the channels of sponsorship dry up for Jewish refugees 
from Germany, but the authorities also sought to slow down the flow of new arrivals. The 
relief organisations had to cope with an increasing number of people who arrived in Britain 
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and did not move on. In November 1938, the British government had estimated the number 
of refugees in the country at around eleven thousand. By July 1939, this number had 
multiplied fourfold, and some estimates suggest sixfold. 120 By that time, admissions to 
Palestine had been suspended as a punishment for Zionist-organised illegal immigration. 
This also had repercussions on refugees given temporary protection in the United 
Kingdom.121 As a result, the authorities exercised greater scrutiny over the emigration 
prospects of those applying for admission.122 The increasing financial burden on the Jewish 
refugee organisations in Great Britain as the result of the increasing inflow all but exhausted 
their resources. In August 1939 the Jewish refugee aid organisations realized that they could 
not take responsibility for more refugees and communicated this decision to the British 
authorities.123 At the same time the BCRC, which had been conducting relief operations for 
refugees from Czechoslovakia in Poland also fell into financial problems.  
The British refusal to co-finance the upkeep of refugees had been slowly eroded 
during 1939. The authorities had long been aware of the time bomb under its liberal 
admissions policy and in July 1939, seven months after they had decided to finance the re-
emigration of Czech refugees, the British authorities agreed to do the same for Jewish 
refugees from Germany and Austria.124 This decision went some way to alleviating the 
responsibility of private organisations for the temporary relief and re-emigration of refugees. 
The British authorities tried to muster international, and most importantly, American support 
for a private-public mix of refugee relief. In proposing this at the Intergovernmental 
Committee, the British representative Earl Winterton, referred to the British public support for 
refugees from Czechoslovakia, the maintenance of 3,000 refugees by the Belgian 
government and the Dutch undertaking to build the camp at Westerbork and suggested a 
departure ‘from the principle agreed unanimously at Evian, that no participating Government 
would give direct financial assistance to refugees’. He proposed that private subscription to 
an international fund to assist in defraying the expenses of overseas emigration of refugees 
might be encouraged by Government participation, possibly on a basis proportionate to the 
amount of private subscription.125 In spite of this, the British authorities refused to act 
unilaterally. When the news came that the BCRC was out of funds the relief operations for 
refugees from Czechoslovakia in Poland had to cease immediately.126 
When the war broke out in September 1939 a totally new political equilibrium was 
created in which liberal influences lost much of their clout and all the developments 
chronicled above were suspended. The outbreak of the Second World War meant that the 
resolve of the Belgian authorities to carry out a blind deportation policy was never really put 
to the test and the Anglo-Jewish community never discovered if their financial difficulties 
would have led to a halt to Jewish’ refugee immigration. Even the very cautious Dutch 
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reforms and the more resolute French steps towards a more liberal refugee policy could be 
pursued no further.  
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Conclusion 
 
All the European countries surveyed here had alien policies based on slightly differing precepts 
that derived from their respective domestic social, economic, and political circumstances. The 
predominance of Liberalism in the nineteenth century and its strictures on the relationship 
between the individual and the state had an impact on alien legislation in all countries 
considered. Resident aliens were considered de facto members of the nation and therefore 
protected against abuses of state power. All other immigrants were granted some protection 
(equality before the law, basic rights), based on the provisions within each state’s constitution, 
but this could go even further for those immigrants who were defined as refugees. 
 During and immediately after the First World War, these policies were adapted, initially 
to exclude unwanted political elements and to meet diplomatic imperatives. In particular, the 
fear of ‘alien’ ideologies such as bolshevism being imported from abroad entailed a loss of 
the liberal protection based on the rights of man. Identifying these ideologies as alien 
reflected the strong push towards nation-building in the early twentieth century as part of the 
integrative revolution in response to the democratisation of politics. Political elites wanted a 
state-community that shared a national identity.  Policy towards aliens was also caught up in 
this integrative policy; imposing on immigrants the duty to assimilate in order to preserve a 
cultural status quo. However, the precise nature of this assimilation was subject of controversy, 
and attempts to homogenize the population or protect an established cultural order produced an 
exclusionary trend which perceived certain ethnic or religious groups as inassimilable.  
 Changes in alien policy during this period were nonetheless still predominantly 
determined by economic interests. Increasing democratisation gave a voice to the previously 
politically disenfranchised and enabled them to oppose state policies that were detrimental to 
what they perceived as their interests. A protectionist immigration policy was one of the 
innovations concomitant with the transformation of the liberal state into a nation-state. 
However, countervailing forces remained. There were the interests of tourism, international 
travel and trade that placed a premium on the free movement of peoples, but most 
importantly the interests of employers who wanted free access to the international labour 
market, but at the same time wanted to recoup their investment in procuring manpower 
abroad. In practice, the turmoil in the years after 1918 was ultimately replaced with more 
relaxed policies before the economic recession of the early 1930s finally convinced each of the 
liberal western European state to reappraise its immigration policies and led to restrictions on 
the admission of immigrants and especially foreign labour.  
The transformation of alien policy that began at the end of the nineteenth century had 
thus two objectives: economic protection, a result of the increasing power of labour within the 
political system, and concerns about national identity that has been dubbed ‘nativism’. In this 
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process, the more ambitious use of alien policy by increasingly interventionist states meant 
that the liberal political culture that had traditionally acted to defend the individual against the 
state lost of its influence. Security measures taken as a result of the First World War 
dramatically changed the operation of pre-war immigration and residence policies, and these 
were seldom completely restored after 1919. From a position of near equality, aliens were 
increasingly excluded from the rights afforded to citizens of these countries.  
 This demise of Liberalism can clearly be seen in changes to policies on refugees. Before 
1914 there had been a general acceptance in liberal states that those who had to flee their 
country for political reasons had to be protected, but after 1918 the right to asylum had all but 
ceased to exist. Refugees arriving at the borders of the liberal states of Europe were now 
habitually dealt with under the terms of the newly erected protectionist immigration policies. 
Russian and Armenian refugees were the first victims of this change in attitude, but thanks to 
the political sympathy aroused by these anti-bolshevist Russians their arrival was no lasting 
problem. Most importantly the need for additional labour in Western Europe at the moment of 
their arrival facilitated their reception.  
Thus, it is important to realise that the arrival of refugees from Nazi Germany after 
January 1933 did not take place in a legislative vacuum, but against a background of existing 
structures, legal precedents and controls. Put another way, nearly all the factors that played 
some role in determining policy during and after 1933 were already in place long before the 
Nazis came to power. No national immigration policies were identical, but two basic models 
can be identified: the British model that emphasized external immigration control, comprising 
border controls and visa schemes, and the Continental model where control was much more 
a mixture of external and internal control. Within the Continental model we can distinguish 
two types: on the one hand the centralized one and on the other the decentralized type 
employed by countries such as Switzerland, Denmark and the Netherlands. In these  latter 
countries, regional and local authorities had considerable influence on the practical 
application of aliens policy that created local variations within these countries.  Another 
important difference within the Continental model was the manner in which undesirable 
immigrants from Central Europe were removed. For example, while France merely obliged 
such people to leave the country on their own initiative, the Belgian authorities physically 
took them to the border and the Dutch formally extradited them to the German authorities. 
These differences in national immigration policies would ultimately have important 
repercussions for the refugees from Nazi Germany.  
On the eve of the refugee crisis of 1933 all countries had the legislative means to deal 
with people coming from Germany, but rapidly realised that practical solutions were difficult 
to enforce. The authorities baulked at expelling ‘Jewish’ and political refugees who had 
entered the countries illegally or whose visas or residence permits had expired. For 
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humanitarian reasons deporting them to Germany was considered unacceptable, while 
passing them on to other states created diplomatic problems. National policies towards 
aliens continued to have many differences, but there was a general strengthening of internal 
controls in the countries of continental Europe that made it increasingly difficult for refugees 
to remain unnoticed or to stand in for their own upkeep. The arrival of ‘Jewish’ refugees played 
a crucial role in this process of restrictionism, but it has to be seen primarily as a continuation of 
the policies adopted to counter the effects of economic recession rather than directed 
specifically against those fleeing from Germany. Thus, while the numbers of people coming 
from Germany between 1933 and the summer of 1935 declined, the climate of increasing 
restrictionism nonetheless continued.  
 In effect, the main determinants of policy in this period remained the custom and 
practice of aliens policy combined with increasing economic nationalism, anti-bolshevism, and 
(fears of) antisemitism. This development has to be seen more as an expression of the 
increasing power of representatives of labour and the middle classes in government, than as a 
reaction against the influx of refugees from Nazi Germany per se. The latter received a great 
deal of attention in the media, out of all proportion to their actual numbers. Their portrayal as a 
continuous and increasing flow of immigrants gave important ammunition to restrictionists who 
saw Jews (and communists) as ‘alien’ to the established cultural boundaries of the nation and 
undesirable as prospective citizens and even a danger to national unity. Although the 
measures enacted affected a much broader constituency, the arrival of the refugees from 
Germany was an important, albeit symbolic, catalyst in the final push for restrictive alien 
legislation in the later 1930s.  
In those years there was also a convergence across Western Europe in both policy 
and treatment towards those regarded as refugees. A striking example is the way that 
Belgian and French refugee policies – which had operated on completely different lines in the 
summer of 1933 – had become so similar by the beginning of 1934. Although no Western 
European  country had a legal provision for these fugitives, there was hardly any thought given 
to a blanket exclusion. Switzerland did have an administrative provision for refugees, and she 
was quickly followed by the other liberal states of Western Europe. Traditions of nineteenth 
century liberalism were thus strong enough to force all liberal states to open their borders for 
refugees. The protection of refugees was a principle that liberal states upheld, it was an 
essential element of the national self-image and sections of public opinion could be mobilized 
for its defence. The creation of the ‘refugee’ as an administrative category within immigration 
policy was also the result of refugee resistance to being treated as normal immigrants. 
Refugees were increasingly dissociated from other forms of immigration and more 
benevolently treated. Only a geographically isolated Great Britain was to a large extent able 
to withstand this pressure for change. The British authorities accepted refugees, but they 
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remained in a position to control who was admitted and under what circumstances. This was 
a luxury denied to their continental counterparts who, as frontline states, had to come to 
terms with large numbers of uninvited refugees.  
Crucial in immigration policy was who the authorities defined as refugees. By 1935, 
political and ‘Jewish’ refugees were treated differently in most countries. Political refugees 
were given certain privileges such as longer-term residence status and even permission to 
work, whereas ‘Jews’ were given some form of temporary protection at most. This can be 
explained in part by the fact that political fugitives corresponded more closely to the 
traditional image of a refugee; of people who, because of their political ideas and deeds, had 
suddenly to flee their country to save their life or freedom. Such political refugees had not 
planned their flight and their departure was often in defiance of the authorities in their 
homeland. By force of circumstance they arrived suddenly and empty-handed in a 
neighbouring country. Such (political) refugees also benefited from support given to them 
inside countries of refuge by left-wing political parties. This led to a type of informal refugee 
status being afforded in most liberal states in Continental Europe and a more formal refugee 
status in Switzerland. Western European states continued to give asylum to political refugees 
even when they ignored restrictions placed on their working or engaging in political activities, 
but increasingly relied on prisons and internment camps as a deterrent. In comparative terms 
the Netherlands was definitely the least generous towards political refugees, its leniency 
towards them often only amounted to a choice of frontier over which to be expelled.  
Conversely in both Belgium and France, the entry of socialists into government in the 
mid 1930s gave the impetus for some improved facilities for refugees. In France, concessions 
were limited to an amnesty for all refugees from Nazi Germany present in France in 1936, but 
the French Popular Front government refused to formalize refugee policy for new arrivals. 
Belgium on the other hand joined Switzerland by drawing a clear dividing line between 
refugees and immigrants in immigration policy. Refugees became legally entitled to claim 
asylum. Elsewhere there was an unwillingness to grant a specific legal status to those fleeing 
persecution and policy remained informal and discretionary.  
 Little changed before 1938 and only political activists whose lives or freedom were 
endangered were eligible for asylum. This was the case in Belgium and Switzerland, with a 
formal refugee policy, and in Denmark and France which retained an informal refugee 
regime. These policies had few, if any, effects on those fleeing Germany’s racial anti-
Semitism. The ‘Jewish’ refugees’ reasons for flight were not considered sufficient in themselves 
to accord them a privileged status as ‘refugees’. Although ‘Jews‘ fleeing Nazi Germany are 
nowadays often portrayed as refugees par excellence, before 1938 ‘Jews’ were less visibly 
the victims of state persecution than political activists, and this helps to explain the less 
g`enerous' response.  
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 In 1933 it was possible for ‘Jews’ to arrive from Germany and be treated as regular 
immigrants, provided they could show sufficient means to establish themselves. However, 
increasing German restrictions on the export of goods and currency made this more difficult, 
and the increased imposition of work and business permit legislation meant that only very 
few ‘Jewish’ refugees were able to enter Western European states on this basis. For the vast 
majority, the only option was to arrive in a chosen country of refuge, and then look for 
support from the indigenous Jewish communities or their refugee committees. These 
committees effectively decided who were temporarily protected by granting financial aid. In 
this manner the authorities were able to fulfil their humanitarian ‘obligations’, without incurring 
any financial costs or adding any foreign workers to their labour market. The fact that the 
Jewish organizations provided a possible solution by arranging facilities for their re-
emigration made further concessions unnecessary.  
The political costs of a humanitarian policy towards (‘Jewish’) refugees should not be 
underestimated. Although the authorities made no binding commitments and left a great deal 
of discretion to its administrators, ‘Jewish’ immigration from Nazi Germany was largely 
uncontrolled. Aliens who had arrived illegally or overstayed their permits were not subject to 
expulsion if the Jewish refugee aid committees supported them. These committees therefore 
carried a heavy burden, as they were effectively sub-contracted by the state to make 
decisions and then supported those chosen on a temporary basis while at the same time 
expediting their re-emigration without incurring any costs for the host country. For potential 
refugees, the existence of even temporary protection could be a pull factor. Although the 
design of this informal refugee policy enabled the authorities to reaffirm immigration control 
at any time, it could also convey an impression of loss of control over the country’s frontiers 
and this was often used against governments by political groups seeking to exploit anti-
immigrant sentiment within the population.  
The differential treatment of ‘Jewish’ and political refugees was undermined by the 
radicalization of Nazi antisemitic policy in the aftermath of the Anschluss. At this point, all 
countries had to confront the reality of large numbers of ‘Jews’ arriving at the border or inside 
the country with genuine evidence that their lives might be in danger if they returned to 
Germany. Yet in spite of the overwhelming weight of evidence, refugee policy remained 
largely unaltered and by the summer of 1938, ‘Jewish’ refugees were even encountering 
outright hostility; from consular authorities, at the border and even inside the countries of 
refuge themselves. Most liberal states of Continental Europe started to deport refugees from 
within the country which was the most conspicuous departure from previous policies. That 
refugees who had succeeded in entering the territory of a liberal state and were 
recommended by the local refugee committee for protection were removed by force 
amounted to a challenge of the moral codes of behaviour of these liberal states. France did 
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not follow this trend, even though the French authorities only partly legalised the residence of 
refugees. France seldom physically deported people, but the reception was no more 
welcoming than elsewhere, as in France internment was used as a deterrent. 
The reasons for this rupture in refugee policy were common to all countries. Most 
importantly ‘Jewish’ flight after the Anschluss (with the obvious connivance of German 
authorities) was raging out of control. The arrival of ever more refugees, stripped of their 
possessions convinced the authorities that they should halt further ‘Jewish’ immigration, 
notwithstanding the guarantee of the Jewish committees. This restrictive attitude within 
Continental Europe has to be seen within its international context as it became increasingly 
difficult for those ‘Jewish’ refugees who had been granted provisional asylum in the liberal 
states in Continental Europe to find any country willing to take them as immigrants. While 
numerous states paid lip service to the idea of international negotiation to provide a solution 
to the problem of refugees from Germany and elsewhere, the lack of positive action from the 
Evian Conference in the summer of 1938 demonstrated a complete lack of collective political 
will. Thus the whole issue remained primarily a domestic one, tempered only by its effects on 
relations with Germany on the one hand, and relations with neighbouring states on the other. 
Each European government had to consider the other states’ policy and each of them was 
afraid to become the magnet, implying that the policy of the most restrictive state set the tone. 
The fear of being out of step or too generous triggered pre-emptive actions and produced an 
upward spiral of restriction. 
The illiberal policy of denying ‘Jewish’ refugees any protection was initially legitimized 
by the German policy of dumping. The liberal values which had guided refugee policy until 
then were exchanged for decisiveness in face of this violation of international law. However 
this resolve was only the trigger for a full-blown attack on the temporary protection of ‘Jewish’ 
refugees. The Dutch authorities even blatantly called (non-political) refugees ‘unwanted’, but 
it seems that the Netherlands was quickly surpassed by the other Continental European 
countries who eliminated most humanitarian considerations in daily migration management 
practice. 
The increasing difficulty of denying that ‘Jews’ fleeing Germany were refugees meant 
that the authorities of the liberal countries bordering Nazi Germany preferred to stem the flow 
by border and remote controls; external controls that were largely invisible to the public and 
could be organised through administrative dictat and without scrutiny. Border control was 
strengthened, but it remained dependent on diplomatic considerations. Shortly after the 
Anschluss, several countries executed a straightforward bureaucratic border policy whereby 
insufficiently documented aliens, i.e. ‘Jewish’ refugees without visa, were collectively refused 
admission to the country. Other frontline states were not eager, for the sake of a more effective 
external control to jeopardize their relations with Germany and developed a more 
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personalized system of border control to keep ‘Jewish’ refugees out. Both groups of 
countries had problems in making such a policy work and differentiating between the 
unwanted refugees and the mass of travellers. The introduction of the J-stamp on the 
German passports solved that problem and homogenized, to a large extent, the manner in 
which ‘Jewish’ refugees were routinely refused admission, not only at the borders of the 
liberal states of Western Europe, but also at the desks in their consulates.  
Greater efficiency at the border was not the sole purpose of newly developed 
migration control strategies in the course of 1938. Notwithstanding strengthened and more 
efficient control, the border remained permeable. To counter this defect, states increasingly 
focussed on developing preventive measures outside their national frontiers. This strategy of 
remote control by liberal states aimed to control the movement of refugees before they 
arrived at their borders. The introduction of the J-stamp is a striking example of how liberal 
countries -in this case Switzerland (and Sweden)- were manoeuvring to partly subcontract 
their selective immigration policy to Germany. In trying to re-affirm controls over immigration, 
liberal countries did not eschew even greater complicity with the Nazis. The most conspicuous 
example is that by insisting on German cooperation at the border, Swiss and Belgian authorities 
gave the impetus to the radical shift in German emigration policy in the autumn of 1938 that 
saw the complete cessation of their dumping policy on their Western borders.     
This brutal immigration policy, including the deportation of refugees was enacted 
through instructions issued to government agencies, local border officials and civil servants, 
rather than through new legislation that would have to be discussed, justified and formally 
promulgated. In this way, the executive authorities preserved their complete control of 
migration management; a control they did not want to relinquish as they strove to keep their 
actions away from any public scrutiny. However, when challenged, they were quite prepared 
to legitimise their stance by denying that the ‘Jews’ fleeing Germany were refugees. The 
seemingly persuasive argument was that these ‘Jews’ left Germany with the agreement of 
the German authorities, while (political) refugees had to flee surreptitiously. The liberal states 
of Western Europe, including the Netherlands promoted the protection of the political 
adversaries of the Nazi regime, including the communists, to a fundamental principle in 
liberal migration management. This mantra gave persecuted political activists an entitlement 
to asylum and was the counterweight to the attack on temporary protection for Jewish 
refugees. By 1938 the rigid hierarchy of Nazi persecution employed by Western European 
refugee policy in 1933 was used to deny ‘Jews’ fleeing Germany any protection.   
The violence of the ReichsKristallnacht made it obvious that the Nazi state was at 
least complicit in the persecution of Jews. Switzerland, Luxemburg and Denmark, (although 
the latter was hardly exposed to migratory pressures) persisted in routine exclusionary 
practices at the border, but also in the countries themselves. Most people in need of 
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protection remained excluded. In contrast, Belgium and the Netherlands softened the 
application of regulations which had dehumanized their immigration policies. In November 
1938 the Netherlands reaffirmed its solidarity with the ‘Jewish’ victims of Nazi persecution, 
but only a month later the Dutch authorities considered that the sheer numbers admitted 
could no longer be sustained. Although the Dutch had followed the French example by 
confining refugees in camps, this was not considered a sufficient deterrent. Deportation of 
‘Jewish’ refugees became again official Dutch policy, although this policy was full of 
ambiguity. During 1939 the Netherlands equivocated between a policy of forcible deportation 
and legalization. Belgium, which in November 1938 resumed the policy of protecting ‘Jewish’ 
refugees by subcontracting large elements of internal immigration control to the aid 
committees, did not stop this until the outbreak of the Second World War. This consistency 
was the result of an assertive humanitarian lobby, expressing itself most virulently at the 
moment of the ReichsKristallnacht and galvanized by a Minister in charge of immigration 
policy who had provocatively defended his inhumane ‘realpolitik’. This coincidence of factors 
meant that internal migration control moved out of the closed forums of Belgian policy 
making and into the public arena. This outspoken politicisation of immigration policy meant 
that the influx of refugees could not be downgraded to a technical matter of migration control 
and the political elite had to take a watchful public into account.  
Notwithstanding the existence of an institutionalized refugee policy, even in Belgium 
the relative merits of the politically and racially persecuted were still evaluated differently: 
while political refugees were granted a right of abode, ‘Jewish’ refugees were denied refugee 
status.  ‘Jews’ from Germany remained ‘only’ temporarily protected as part of an informal 
refugee policy. Administrative discretion was preserved and the concessions to (‘Jewish’) 
refugees could be withdrawn. Concomitant with this dual refugee policy, the Belgian 
authorities also pressurised the German authorities to regulate cross-border traffic in line with 
existing agreements. These diplomatic initiatives underline the Janus-faced attitude of the 
Belgian authorities towards those fleeing Nazi Germany. Publicly all refugees were granted 
asylum, but ‘Jewish’ refugees received a lesser asylum and at the same time the Belgian 
authorities secretly tried to convince the Germans to keep their ‘Jewish’ persecutees ‘at 
home’. The latter strategy of pressurizing the German authorities to stop unauthorized 
immigration into their territory could also be seen in Switzerland, but was totally absent in 
Denmark and the Netherlands, countries which refrained from anything that could annoy its 
powerful neighbour.   
The continental European liberal states had to deal with refugees who simply 
appeared inside its frontiers, but in contrast, Britain could develop a refugee policy without a 
similar pressing need to respond to the asylum claims of uninvited guests. After 
ReichsKristallnacht the British authorities made a conscious decision to offer asylum to 
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people in danger in Germany and their intervention in offering a solution to a considerable 
number of victims was a clear departure from past policies. It remained an informal refugee 
policy financed by charitable sources, but private sponsors obtained considerably more 
leeway. Britain, as not being a country of first asylum and moreover protected by the North 
Sea, retained the ability to impose a pre-selection of the refugees she admitted. Still it seems 
that those few who managed to arrive in the country illegally were treated in a humane 
manner as there is no evidence of any direct repatriation to Nazi Germany. Outside Europe 
no country developed a similar pro active refugee policy, on the contrary national 
protectionism held sway and refugees from Nazi Germany were usually the least welcome 
immigrants. Re-emigration from the first countries of asylum stalled, posing a problem for 
Britain and even more so for the frontline states which were left with an increasing number of 
uninvited and destitute refugees from Germany.  
 
Explaining different refugee and immigration policies  
 
In making direct comparisons between these western European states, it is apparent that 
their national policies towards aliens in general and refugees in particular differed in 1933 
and remained at variance throughout the 1930s. The evolution of policy in the liberal states 
of Western Europe was dependent on a myriad of factors. The historical legacy is clearly the 
most obvious element, involving as it does increasing state intervention in matters of 
immigration. The administrative structures of the state also had a direct influence on the 
development and execution of immigration policy and on the stances taken on the question 
of refugees in all countries. There were several other factors which had a direct, and perhaps a 
crucial influence on the development and execution of immigration policy and on the stances 
taken on the question of refugees in all countries. The first was the role of the civil service in 
general and key individuals in particular. To some extent the arrival of refugees from Germany 
after 1933 prompted fears in bureaucratic circles about the perceived lack of control over 
immigration. This can be seen against the background of growing concern during the inter-war 
period about the general efficiency of government and its various agencies. All of this led to a 
continuing pressure for rules and regulations to be tightened in order to provide the civil 
servants with the necessary tools to carry out their tasks efficiently. Alongside this, it is essential 
to consider the role of key individuals in all countries whose specific position gave them a pivotal 
role in determining how individual states responded to the refugees and to immigration 
generally. It could be argued that men such as Robert de Foy, Heinrich Rothmund and Eigil 
Thune Jacobsen were all part of a new technocratic breed, basing their thinking on the precepts 
suggested above. However fears about the (Jewish and communist) refugees can clearly be 
seen in their writings of de Foy and Rothmund, suggesting that they also espoused deeply 
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conservative opinions that were brought to bear on their work.  Irrespective of this, their central 
role in the administration of border control, policing and the execution of admissions policy gave 
them enormous power in being able to instruct their subordinates on the one hand and to 
influence cabinet ministers through the provision of information and advice on the other. The 
role of key individuals and the administration thus has to be evaluated by positioning them 
within the power structures of both state and society. The Belgian case documents the 
importance of retaining a broad picture of decision-making on this issue. Here, refugee policy 
became an issue of public importance in the autumn of 1938 and from then onwards, the 
responsible government Ministers were afraid of a negative political backlash if more 
selective refugee policies were introduced. Thus Robert de Foy in Belgium had to bow to 
political opposition, while his Swiss counterpart, Heinrich Rothmund, did not. Likewise in 
Luxemburg and Denmark, immigration policy remained largely isolated from public scrutiny 
and refugee policy largely evaporated in a process of tightened immigration policy.   
It is important to underline the different ways in which policy was carried out. At one 
level, it is clear that legislation against aliens was not always fully implemented, or that there 
was a tacit understanding that some of its provisions would not be employed. Thus, there might 
be implicit toleration of people who, under a strict interpretation of the law, should have been 
expelled. At another level, it is also clear that the structures and systems in all countries 
provided a degree of autonomy, both for civil servants and the judiciary, and also for local 
officials. Centralization appears to have been greatest in Belgium and Luxembourg. In 
Denmark and the Netherlands, policy implementation was far more decentralized and 
allowed greater scope for the autonomy of regional or local officials, while during the 1930s, 
Switzerland shifted further towards the Belgian model with questions of residence being 
added to border control and admissions policies that were already the responsibility of the 
federal government. These administrative structures undoubtedly served to influence policy-
making in a number of ways. For example, civil servants’ autonomy to act independently of 
political influences or public opinion may have served either to strengthen the enforcement of 
regulations, or equally to have provided some amelioration of these same regulations. These 
freedoms, which undoubtedly varied from one country to another and also over time, may help 
to explain why it is so difficult to ascertain exactly how alien and immigration policies were 
implemented, at the border or by the police and bureaucrats inside the country. 
 Last, but not least we should also mention the refugees themselves. The refugees were 
not merely passive victims, but also agents of their own destiny and their collective actions 
also influenced the aliens policy of the liberal states. The responses were highly interactive, 
as the closing of one border deflected refugees towards other borders. Empirical indications 
point that out. For example it is at the time when Switzerland closed its borders to Austrian 
Jews that emigration to the Benelux soared. This interactivity among asylum applicants of 
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various countries is still a largely neglected subject. Further research  needs to refine the 
correlation between the direction of flight, German emigration policy and West European 
immigration policies. To have a clear picture of this, it is essential to see how individual 
decisions coupled with the agency of the various indigenous and international refugee aid 
groups framed the ways in which Western European states tackled this most intractable of 
problem of the 1930s.  
The open-ended situation at the outbreak of the Second World War is testimony of 
the quandary in which the policy makers in Western Europe found themselves. They were 
fully aware of Nazi persecution taking place within Germany and therefore carry some 
responsibility for the failures in maintaining their supposedly liberal values. However this 
responsibility is a shared one. When the situation in Germany became more and more acute, 
policy makers in countries outside Europe also tightened their immigration policy and refused 
to relieve the frontline states of their burden. Although increasing restrictions was always an 
attractive option, especially when the Nazis systematically stripped the refugees of all their 
possessions, the very different choices made in the various (frontline) states demonstrates 
that the outcome was by no means preordained. Respect for human rights remained a value 
that could be mobilized in political struggles, within the political elite and within society at 
large.  
The sovereign right of the state to refuse an individual entry to its territory, even if he 
or she was identified as a refugee, was seldom ever contested. Once refugees crossed the 
frontier they were no longer merely emigrants, but became asylum applicants to whom 
national norms could be applied. This normative dimension in immigration policy was only 
partly the result of internationally agreed norms. The international refugee regime was 
accepted only by some of the liberal states, and in any case imposed few obligations on the 
immigration policies. Likewise national refugee regimes failed to enforce a humanitarian 
policy towards the mass of refugees. Even the agencies in Belgium and Switzerland in 
charge of immigration policy argued that the protection afforded to the (political) refugees 
was not applicable to the mass of ‘Jewish’ refugees. Yet even when Western European 
states resorted to the deportation of  ‘Jewish’ refugees, they still had to legitimise this to 
liberal public opinion and the various aid and charitable organisations involved. Knowledge of 
such deportations often sparked off protests and their strength served to some extent to 
determine subsequent refugee policy. The liberal values, of which granting asylum to 
refugees was an intrinsic part, were only mobilized against a state when it used its coercive 
powers inside its own borders, but there was little or no protest against inhumane measures 
carried out in the form of external controls. The relevant authorities realized this all too well 
and therefore maintained their preference for external control exercised well away from 
domestic public scrutiny.  
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The liberal frontline states seem to have been most successful in keeping out refugees only 
with the most draconian of policies against aliens. Thus only when forced repatriation was 
used to return those who had managed to enter illegally via the green frontiers was the 
migration pressure relieved. Even then, the real effectiveness of these policies remains open 
to question, but it did relieve the authorities of any responsibility for differentiating the 
refugees from the rest among these uninvited guests. By including refugees in the category 
of undocumented aliens who could be automatically deported, immigration procedures 
became more efficient, but this inevitably made it more difficult for the Western European 
states to keep up the appearance of being liberal regimes in every sense of the word.  
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